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This paper explores some of the issues that must be addressed in the overall assessment 
of racial profiling in traffic stops as a public policy.  This analysis explicitly considers 
ethical issues and is therefore conducted with respect to both welfarist and deontological 
considerations.  I argue that the main factors that matter for a welfarist calculation, 
namely the effects of racial profiling on crime, the individual harms that accrue to an 
innocent person who is stopped, as well as the social costs involved in a policy that may 
contribute to stigma against African Americans, are all poorly understood. In contrast, I 
argue that racial profiling involves a clear injustice to innocent African Americans.  The 
lack of precise probabilistic information on the welfarist side of profiling means that the 
assessment of profiling is an example of decisionmaking under ambiguity.  I resolve this 
ambiguity by an appeal to a Fairness Presumption, which requires that there exists an 
affirmative case for a policy that reduces fairness in order for it to be implemented. The 
Fairness Presumption leads to a rejection of racial profiling as a traffic stop strategy. 
Finally, I discuss some relationships between my conclusions about profiling in traffic 
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…a cop pulled him over to the side of the road 
Just like the time and the time before that 
In Paterson that’s just the way things go. 
If you’re black you might as well not show up on the street 
‘Less you wanna draw the heat. 




1. Introduction   
 
In this paper, I attempt to develop a framework for the overall evaluation of 
racial profiling as a public policy.  The objective of this discussion is the development of 
an analysis of racial profiling that explicitly addresses the full range of effects of racial 
profiling on society.  In doing so, I will explicitly focus on ethical issues that arise when 
profiling occurs.  This focus does not mean that I will ignore questions of the efficacy of 
racial profiling with respect to law enforcement goals. Rather, I wish to place such 
factors in a context in which law enforcement objectives represent a subset of the 
desiderata for public policy.  I do not claim to provide a direct way of trading off these 
desiderata. Instead, I will argue that the strength of available evidence is relevant to this 
tradeoff; current arguments about profiling need to account explicitly for the absence of 
strong empirical evidence on many of the factors that come into play when assessing 
profiling.   
  The philosophical issues associated with racial profiling have recently been 
discussed in an important paper by Risse and Zeckhauser (2004). This paper is valuable 
not only for the substantive arguments that are made but also for carefully delineating 
many of the issues that need to be addressed in evaluating racial profiling as a public 
policy.  I will follow the organization of their analysis in considering both welfarist
2 and 
deontological issues in assessing profiling.  While I accept many of the specific claims 
in their work, I will conclude that the case for profiling is substantially weaker than they 
                                                           
2Following Sen (1979) by welfarism I refer to the evaluation of policies on the basis of 
maximizing a function that only depends (positively) on the utilities of individuals in 
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do.  In the discussion that follows, I will attempt to make clear why my conclusions 
differ from Risse and Zeckhauser.  One reason for differences in conclusions is that I 
evaluate racial profiling using somewhat different criteria than those employed by Risse 
and Zeckhauser.  At the same time, I will question several of their arguments on their 
own terms. 
  In my discussion, I will make the following assumptions.  First, I will focus on 
one form of racial profiling: highway traffic stops in which the objective of the stops is 
to identify drug carriers.  As such, the pretexts for the stops (traffic violations, etc.) have 
no intrinsic importance.  Further, by focusing on this specific context, it is possible to 
discuss the state of evidence on the factors that are relevant to evaluating a profiling 
policy.  Second, I assume that there are no errors in stops and searches in the sense that 
once someone is stopped, if he is innocent he is always let go whereas if he is guilty he 
is always arrested.   Third, I ignore any issues of differential punishments by race; all 
criminals are assumed to have committed the same offense and receive the same 
punishment.  Fourth, I do not question whether various drug laws are themselves just. 
These assumptions allow the discussion to focus on the main issues specific to profiling 
as a police strategy. 
Section 2 of this essay defines some basic probabilities concerning stops and 
searches, guilt and innocence, and race. These probabilities, it will be argued, are the 
empirical objects needed for evaluating various arguments in favor of and against 
profiling.  Section 3 considers welfarist approaches to assessing profiling.  Section 4 
explores deontological considerations.  Section 5 discusses the question of how to 
evaluate arguments in favor and against profiling when these arguments depend on 
quantities that are not identified from available data.  Section 6 evaluates how the 
framework I describe affects the analysis of other policy questions, specifically profiling 
and terrorism and affirmative action.  Section 7 contains summary and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Basic Issues: some probabilities relevant to assessing profiling 
                                                                                                                                                                           
society. Sometimes, this is described as utilitarianism, but I reserve the latter for social 
welfare functions defined by the sum of individual utilities. 
  2 
 
The basic issues that arise in evaluating profiling can be understood using simple 
probability arguments. This approach is developed in a recent paper by Dominitz (2003), 
who shows how to translate various notions of fairness in police behavior into 
probability statements; I will employ a modified version of his framework.   To do this, 
let   denote black and white, k denote the fraction of the population that is 
black, 
 and  BW
I and   denote innocence and guilt, and S denote the event of a police stop.  G
The first set of probabilities that is relevant in analyzing profiling describes 
police behavior.  The police face a decision with respect to the allocation of a fixed rate 
of traffic stops C between black and white drivers. A stop strategy is a pair 
 




( Pr SW)  = probability of stop if white 
 
which are consistent with the overall stop rate, i.e.  
 
  () ( ) ( ) Pr 1 Pr kS B k S WC + −= . (1) 
 
A random stop and search policy is simply a special case where the search probabilities 
are equal.  Profiling strategies are those where  ( ) ( ) Pr Pr SB SW > , since interest in the 
question derives from the oversampling of blacks. 
  A profiling strategy, in turn, affects the choices made by individuals on whether 
or not to commit a crime.  Expressing behaviors in terms of innocence, these choices, 
which represent the only behavioral aspect of the analysis, are described by 
 
() ( Pr ,Pr ) I WS W  =  probability of innocence if white given stop strategy 




() ( Pr ,Pr ) I BS B  = probability of innocence if black given stop strategy. 
 
For simplicity I ignore sources of heterogeneity within races such as income that will 
lead to different criminal propensities; none of my conclusions would change if this 
assumption were relaxed since one could repeat the analysis conditioning on these 
additional factors.  These race-specific probabilities should not be interpreted as 
implying a causal role for race.  
The choice of a stop strategy combines with the innocence/guilt decisions of 
individuals to produce a set of equilibrium probabilities that form the basis for the 
assessment of racial profiling.  One equilibrium probability of interest is the overall guilt 
rate associated with a stop strategy.  I assume that all effects on the crime rate occur via 
deterrence, i.e. that the withdrawal of criminals from the population is too small to affect 
the crime rate. This allows us to express the equilibrium crime rate as  
 
  () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) Pr Pr ,Pr 1 Pr ,Pr GkG B S B k G W S W =+ − . (2) 
  
I will also be concerned with the rates at which innocent blacks and whites are stopped.  
Unlike the case of the guilt rate, these probabilities will need to be considered 
separately: 
 




( Pr , SIW )  = probability of stop if innocent and white. 
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As will be argued below, together these equilibrium probabilities capture the 
main objects that in principle are needed to assess profiling as a public policy.  One way 
to think about the empirical profiling literature is to ask to what extent the existing 
findings may be used to identify these objects.   
 
 
3. Welfarist considerations 
  
One approach to evaluating a profiling strategy is to do so exclusively in terms of 
its effect on individual welfare for each member of the population.  The racial profiling 
literature, at least in economics, has generally not focused on questions like this. 
Empirical discussions of racial profiling typically treat the number of arrests made in a 
set of stops as the criterion for assessing the program.  There is no reason why this 
criterion is appropriate by itself for evaluating profiling.
3    I now consider some of the 
ways in which a profiling strategy affects individual welfare and consider the extent to 
which there are good reasons to believe a profiling strategy may be justified over a 




What sorts of benefits might accrue to individuals from race-based stop policies?  
One obvious reason why profiling may produce individual benefits is its effect on the 
aggregate crime rate.  The possibility that profiling schemes reduce crime rates lies at 
the heart of welfarist defenses of profiling, as noted by Risse and Zeckhauser (2004, 
144).  The role of profiling in crime reduction has been formally modeled in Persico 
(2002) and Harcourt (2004); the basic analytical issues may be derived as follows.   
Suppose that the police set a stop strategy to minimize the aggregate crime rate. This is a 
standard optimization problem: choose a set of stop rates to minimize (2) subject to (1).  
Assuming the relevant second-order condition holds and the first-order condition holds 
with equality, the profiling strategy that minimizes the overall crime rate is one such that  
                                                           
3This argument is also made in Persico (2002). 
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An alternative way to assess the relationship between profiling and crime minimization 
is to ask whether there is a profiling strategy that dominates a random stop strategy.  
Some form of profiling is efficient (again assuming relevant second-order conditions) 
when the changes in probability associated with search probabilities are unequal across 
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When this holds, at the margin, some disproportionate search of blacks relative to whites 
can be efficient.  
As a theoretical matter, profiling may be required in order to fulfill a condition 
such as (3) or (4).  This question reveals an important problem with existing empirical 
work on profiling, namely, the gap that exists between the current body of empirical 
evidence and deterrence.  To assert that there are significant deterrence effects from 
profiling requires evidence on the sensitivity of individual crime decisions within each 
group to changes in the probability of being searched when guilty.  However, this is not 
what is measured by studies that calculate the levels of crime rates across groups and 
there is no obvious reason why crime rates may be used to infer sensitivities to changes 
in arrest rates. In particular, the empirical profiling literature, in which Knowles, 
Persico, and Todd (2001) is a seminal contribution, has focused on the guilt rates across 
groups in environments where profiling occurs.
5  The reason for this emphasis is that the 
                                                           
4Notice that the population ratios do not appear in this equation. Intuitively, tradeoff in 
stop and search rates between races is exactly offset by the population ratio differences 
in the effects of the stop and search rates on overall crime. 
5The basic Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) framework for modeling taste 
discrimination versus statistical discrimination has been adopted quite widely in 
profiling studies in economics. A nice recent example is Anwar and Fang (2004) who 
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main question motivating empirical studies of this type is whether the disproportionate 
rates at which black motorists are stopped reflect a taste for discrimination or whether 
they are consistent with a stop strategy that maximizes the total number of arrests; the 
latter case means that differential stop and search rates may be interpreted as a form of 
statistical discrimination.  A key implication of Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) is 
that arrest maximization requires that  
 
  () ( ) Pr , Pr , GSW GSB = . (5) 
 
Their analysis shows that this equality in general holds for Maryland data when there is 
profiling of blacks in stops.  However, one cannot move from this finding to conclude 
that observed profiling strategies are efficient in terms of reducing crime rates; (5) and 
either (3) or (4) are different conditions, a point discussed in detail in Persico (2002). 
  It is easy to imagine cases where (5) is inconsistent with either (3) or (4). As a 
simple example, suppose that searches are restricted to black and white teenagers and 
under a policing rule where the probability of a stop is independent of race, the 
percentage of black teenagers carrying drugs is higher than whites.  This does not imply 
that a marginal change should be made to increase the search rate among blacks.  It is 
possible that the white teenagers will exhibit greater sensitivity in their choice of 
whether to commit a crime to a change in detection probability than the black teenagers. 
The derivative of a race-specific guilt rate with respect to the stop probability will 
depend on factors such as stigma for arrest, which presumably is lower in communities 
in which high percentages of black males have been incarcerated, or because of lesser 
labor market opportunities.   
The general reason why one cannot use the available evidence to assess overall 
efficiency of profiling as a crime reduction measure is that there is no one-to-one 
mapping between the presence of equal guilt probabilities in the presence of profiling 
and the efficient allocation of police effort.  This is a classic identification problem in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
study profiling in which forms of heterogeneity in motorist and policy behavior are 
allowed. They concur with Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) that one can interpret 
observed stop patterns as consistent with the absence of taste discrimination. 
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econometrics.  Hence, a welfarist argument for racial profiling is difficult to sustain 
based on the empirical observation of equal guilt probabilities if the basis of the 
argument is that profiling is needed for crime minimization.  To be clear, the fact that (5) 
holds empirically is consistent with the claim that profiling minimizes crime rates. But it 
is also consistent with behavioral models of criminal behavior (i.e. descriptions of 
() () Pr ,Pr GW SW  and  ( ) ( Pr ,Pr GB SB)
                                                          
 which together represent a specification of 
how individuals behave in response to different stop and search probabilities) in which 
efficiency requires a violation of (5).   
Deterrence is not the only welfarist argument for profiling. One can also argue 
that individuals benefit from successful arrest strategies because of the utility derived 
from retribution, i.e. from the fact that guilty parties are identified and presumably 
punished for their offenses.  While one might argue that retribution is not a legitimate 
goal in designing a legal system,
6 objections to it are irrelevant from a welfarist 
perspective, which takes the preferences of individuals as given and does not judge these 
preferences as to legitimacy. In other words, objections to retribution are deontological 
and therefore should not be considered if one is operating in a welfarist framework.
7
In the profiling context, one can think of two ways to measure the level of 
retribution; no claim is made that these cover the full range of possible quantifications of 
the concept.  First, one can equate retribution with the total number of arrests, if so, then 
the findings of Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) are consistent with retribution 
“maximization.”  However, this sort of measurement seems odd, since it would imply 
that agents prefer a large number of arrests regardless of the number of criminals. This 
would require that individuals feel retribution is better served in a society with 100 
 
6At an abstract level, I see no reason to regard retribution as an illegitimate goal of 
society. Otherwise, one would have to question the meting out of punishments to Axis 
war criminals, where the possibility of recidivism was presumably zero.  Whether 
retribution is sensible in the context I am discussing is of course quite another matter. 
The point is that one needs a context to make objections to retribution. 
7The idea that one wishes to distinguish between deterrence and retribution as sources of 
individual welfare is a key source of disagreement between non-utilitarian ethical 
positions and utilitarian ones. The notion that our moral intuitions naturally differentiate 
between different sources of utility, to give another example, the utility derived from 
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criminals, 50 of whom are caught than a society in which there are 30 criminals, 29 of 
whom are caught.  An alternative measure of retribution that addresses this concern is 
the number of criminals who are punished because they are caught due to a search.  This 
measure is the equilibrium percentage of guilty persons who are searched,  () Pr SG , 
which equals the ratio of the probability that a motorist is searched given one is guilty to 
the probability that one is guilty: 
  
  ()
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( )
() () ()() ()
1P r P r , P r P r P r , P r
Pr
1 Pr ,Pr Pr ,Pr
kS WG WS W k S BG B S B
SG






Maximization of (6) will not generally produce the condition (5).  Hence the 
equalization of guilt rates does not speak to whether profiling efficiently addresses 
retribution.  Similarly, one cannot use (5) to infer whether profiling is needed for 
retribution.  This illustrates once again that the arrest maximization rule can fail to 
match welfarist objectives. 
  Leaving aside the difficulties of quantifying the benefits of retribution effects, 
there is an argument by which one might conclude that retribution is a second-order 
issue relative to deterrence. To the extent that deterrence and retributive aspects of 
profiling are in conflict, to say that one should trade them off requires that one would, at 
least in principle, accept a higher rate of crime in order to make sure that a higher level 
or percentage of the guilty are punished.  It seems difficult to claim that most individuals 
would prefer this state of affairs. The one exception is that if punishment of a particular 
criminal diminishes the suffering caused by the crime (to the victim, family members, 
etc.) then it is possible that one would choose a higher crime rate because it minimized 
the number of unpunished crimes.  I find this possibility sensible
8, but do not see that it 
                                                                                                                                                                           
reading a novel versus the utility derived from watching a cockfight, is beautifully 
delineated in Sen (1979).  
8One case where retribution might trump deterrence is the following. Suppose near the 
end of World War II a concentration camp commander offered to reduce the number of 
victims in exchange for immunity from post-war prosecution. The retribution costs 
could plausibly be high enough to reject the offer on utilitarian grounds. 
  9 





individual-specific harms to a stop and search 
 
The consequences of a stop strategy for individual welfare extend beyond the 
effect of the strategy on the crime rate.  In assessing the harms that profiling produces 
for individual welfare, it is important to consider the harms from a stop and search that 
accrue to a motorist.  Under the assumption that the total number of stops is constant, the 
implications of profiling have to do with the shifting of stops from blacks to whites. In 
discussing these harms, I will focus exclusively on the harms to innocent blacks and 
whites.  It is hard to imagine that the harms of a stop and search matter to a guilty party 
given a subsequent arrest and punishment and one can also imagine that the magnitude 
of feelings of humiliation and injustice from a search depend on whether the motorist is 
innocent.  However, nothing in my argument is affected if one were to include harms to 
the guilty. 
Are the private costs from a stop and search significant?  Interestingly, this turns 
out to be a major question in efforts to evaluate profiling.  Risse and Zeckhauser’s 
(2004) “in principle” defense of profiling is very much involved in arguing that these 
costs are small.  While acknowledging that the difficulties of providing empirical 
support on the magnitude of the harm (pg. 8) they argue that the costs to innocent 
African Americans from racial profiling are second-order: 
 
“…imagine how much better-off, say African Americans would be if we just 
got rid of profiling, keeping everything else fixed. We think the answer is “only 
slightly so.” (pg.8) 
 
The main basis for this claim is that the harms of profiling in traffic stops only exist 
because of the background of past and contemporary racial harms that African 
Americans experience.  In their view, the reaction to a search is highly sensitive to 
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issues of personal identity and general perceptions of society.  Hence, they imply that a 
profiling strategy that was associated with high intellectual ability, for example, would 
have little intrinsic harm.  
While I concur the harms of profiling to individuals are intimately linked with 
background factors, the Risse and Zeckhauser conclusion that this argues against the 
costs of profiling seems quite wrong.
9 There are three grounds for rejecting their claim.  
First, the fact that the psychological harms to racial profiling only occur in the 
context of experiences of racism and discrimination in no way implies the harms are 
marginal.  This takes a very particular stance on how African Americans are affected by 
stops and searches in a profiling environment.  Risse and Zeckhauser essentially assume 
that blacks experience an overall cost that is a function of the total number of incidents 
(possibly weighted by gravity) which are perceived as involving bigotry.  A second way 
to think about these costs is that background racism sensitizes African Americans and so 
makes individual incidents such as search and stops much more harmful to one’s 
wellbeing than would otherwise be the case.  By analogy, the pain of slapping my back 
is far greater when I am sunburned than when I am not.  So, while the effect of the slap 
is almost entirely contingent on the sunburn, it is because of the sunburn that the pain is 
severe. The strength of opposition of African Americans to profiling at least hints my 
interpretation is more likely the correct one.  
Second, even if the marginal effect of profiling is small, this does not mean that 
the policy is defensible, unless one restricts defensibility in an unappealing way. 
Suppose that the harm to African Americans comes from a set of two types of treatments 
by others and that the harm accrues if either of the types of treatment is experienced.  
Let one treatment be the differential experienced when police assistance is needed and 
the other treatment a stop and search which occurs under a profiling regime.  If one is 
eliminated and the other is not, then the harm to the African American will not be 
reduced. However, for larger sets of potential public policy changes i.e. simultaneously 
changing the treatment in police interactions and eliminating profiling, the costs will be 
                                                           
9When the marginal cost experienced by an African American to an additional act of 
(perceived) racism is a function of the level of (perceived) racism, Risse and Zeckhauser 
are in essence assuming that marginal cost has a negative first derivative.  
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high.  The fact that one may need to bundle elimination of racial profiling with other 
actions does not constitute a welfarist argument that it is unimportant.  
  Third, the assumption that a stop and search is intrinsically a minor 
inconvenience is questionable.  There is no particular reason to believe this is the case.  
Gross and Barnes (2002, 745-746) state: 
 
“As the level of the police officer’s interest increases, the cost to the innocent 
citizen escalates rapidly.  It’s one thing to get a speeding ticket and an annoying 
lecture…it’s quite another to be told to step out of the car and to be 
questioned…The questions may seem intrusive and out of line, but you can 
hardly refuse to answer an armed cop.  At some point you realize you are not 
just another law-abiding citizen who’s being checked out…like everyone else. 
You’ve been targeted. The trooper is not going through a routine so he can let 
you go…he wants to find drugs on you…Those of us who have not been 
through this sort of experience probably underestimate its impact. To be treated 
as a criminal is a basic insult to a person’s self-image and his position in 
society.  It cannot easily be shrugged off…” 
 
It is also important to note that the low harm argument made by Risse and 
Zeckhauser is in principle consistent with a welfarist calculation that the harms are 
significant. Suppose that social welfare is defined by 
 
  ( ) i
i
SWF h u =∑  (7) 
 
where   is individual i’s utility.  If  i u ( ) h ⋅  is concave, then social welfare will reflect  
decreasing marginal benefits to changes in the utility of the low utility agents versus 
high utility agents.  Now suppose that Risse and Zeckhauser are correct that blacks have 
low utilities due to the pervasive background of prejudice they experience.  If so, then 
sufficient concavity of   can produce the result that further decreases in the utility of 
blacks cannot be justified through increases in the utility of others, even if the changes in 
black utility are, when considered in isolation, “small” compared to the increases for 
others.   Of course, this all depends on the size of the benefits, which I have argued are 
not known. The issue this discussion is designed to raise is that the Risse and 
() h ⋅
  12 





Beyond the direct harms of stops to innocent motorists, it is possible that there 
are social harms that are associated with profiling strategies that need to be accounted 
for in assessing the effects of profiling on individual welfare.  
By way of background, it is useful to note that I have so far followed Risse and 
Zeckhauser in evaluating racial profiling under the assumption that police officers 
conduct stops and searches in as inoffensive a way as is possible. However, this 
assumption seems questionable, since any evaluation of racial profiling needs to account 
for what may in fact occur in practice.  By analogy the claim that the best government is 
a benevolent monarchy, since by definition it will choose policies that are best for 
society and implement without impediments, is of little interest since such a government 
could not exist.  Hence, unless Risse and Zeckhauser can make an argument that 
nonabusive profiling is possible, I do not see that this assumption is tenable. One can 
just as easily argue that profiling creates negative stereotypes in the minds of the police 
and makes abuse more likely.  
  More generally, when one considers the effects of profiling in the broader social 
context, one can identify costs beyond the private ones associated with a stop.  In a 
profound recent study of racial inequality in America, Glenn Loury has argued that 
persistent inequality between blacks and whites may be understood as stemming from 
the effects of stigma on blacks.  Loury (2002, pg. 9) defines stigma as 
 
“…the identity unreflectively imputed to someone by observers who, not being 
privy to extensive idiosyncratic information, draw conclusions about a person’s 
deeper qualities on the basis of easily observable indicators that may lie at 
hand.” 
 
  In my interpretation of Loury’s argument, stigma generates racial inequality 
because members of a society face a fundamental identification problem in evaluating 
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issues associated with race, given the limited information from which such evaluations 
are made.  Beliefs such as “blacks are less intelligent than whites partially due to genetic 
factors” may be nonsense from the perspective of the body of evolutionary biology but 
do not lend themselves to refutation given selective and limited observations on African 
Americans.  Further, such beliefs can be self-perpetuating. If stereotypes about racial 
differences in intelligence contribute to lower educational attainment by African 
Americans, by discouraging African Americans from educational investment, producing 
disidentification of the type studied by Claude Steele (1997) and others, then the beliefs 
can be reinforcing.
10
  In this context, racial profiling may be argued to contribute to the promotion of 
racial stigma.  By treating race as an appropriate criterion for policing decisions, the 
perception that crime and race are “fundamentally” linked is reinforced.  The potential 
deleterious effects of thinking in categories have a long tradition in social psychology.  
The classic Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif et al (1961)), in which adolescents who 
were divided arbitrarily into groups developed intergroup prejudices and hostility is the 
most famous example of such research.  The behavioral consequences of stereotyping 
have also been well documented; one interesting controlled experiment due to Rogers 
and Prentice-Dunn (1981) shows how angered whites will be more aggressive towards 
blacks than whites for the same “offense”.  Further, the perception of injustice in society 
by African Americans can be reinforced by the emergence of stigma, which will 
increase the costs of profiling.   
  Of course, there is no body of evidence that quantifies how racial profiling 
affects levels of racial stigma or how racial stigma affects African Americans.  However, 
from the perspective of public policy analysis, the question is not whether one can 
design a sufficiently complicated set of laws that have efficiently decided which 
activities may and may not include profiling, in order to pursue the conflicting goals 
                                                           
10Notice that this is a somewhat different claim from standard formulation of statistical 
discrimination.  In statistical discrimination models, beliefs about the stigmatized group 
are confirmed ex post in equilibrium. Here, the false beliefs produce outcomes that 
militate against their refutation, possibly due to identification problems.  This is one 
reason why I believe Loury’s notion of racial stigma is an important advance on 
statistical discrimination as an explanation of racial inequality.   
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facing a policymaker.  If one is restricted to general legal principles, then a reasonable 
argument can be made that profiling should be ruled out in order to combat stigma. 
 
iii. profiling as redistribution 
 
In considering the different arguments on benefits and harms to profiling, it is 
worth noting that it is widely recognized that African American communities do not 
support racial profiling by the police.  This means (if one takes these preferences as 
fixed) that it is highly likely that in a welfarist calculation, there will be tradeoffs 
between the welfares of blacks and whites under profiling.  Since the Pareto 
improvement arguments cannot be invoked, one is left with the question of how to 
evaluate such tradeoffs.  What makes such an assessment difficult is that one is in 
essence trading off the private harms to stops as well as stigma and respect for one group 
against lower susceptibility to crime (which will apply to both groups.)  Hence, any 
welfarist argument for or against profiling will be sensitive to any implicit egalitarianism 
built into the social welfare function.   
 
iv. evaluating welfarist claims 
 
  I conclude that there does not exist a strong welfarist argument for profiling.  
Does this contradict Risse and Zeckhauser (2004), who argue that in principle there 
exists a welfarist justification for profiling?  While Risse and Zeckhauser agree that the 
case for profiling in traffic stops is weak due to a lack of evidentiary support, they 
present their analysis as a defense of profiling in some cases.  In my view, their 
argument is, as an abstraction and given their assumptions, clearly correct.  If one posits 
first, a welfarist objective and second, the possibility that the costs of profiling are 
plausibly small relative to the benefits, measured in terms of individual utilities, then it 
is necessarily the case that profiling may be justified in principle.  However, I would 
argue that for the case under primary public policy dispute, traffic stops, these 
assumptions are highly questionable.  There is no principled way to assign probabilities 
to the asserted costs and benefits since the empirical literature does not identify either 
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deterrence effects or individual and social harms.  And to the extent to which one relies 
on “fuzzy” notions of the likelihoods of certain levels of costs and benefits, I disagree 
with qualitative claims made by Risse and Zeckhauser, notably on the likelihood that 
costs are small.  This leads me to a different conclusion from Risse and Zeckhauser 
(2004).  However, to say the case is weak does not mean that in an expected value sense, 
the net welfare benefits to profiling are low.  What it means is that many of the factors 
that determine the welfare effects of profiling are not known to a policymaker.  Whether 
this ultimately leads to a rejection of profiling will require some additional 
argumentation on how to assess “ambiguous” environments and is taken up in Section 5.  
 
 
4. Deontological arguments 
 
  By deontological arguments, I refer to evaluations of profiling that are based 
upon ethical rules.  These arguments also weigh against profiling as a policy. My 
argument in this section is that even if one sees a plausible welfarist argument in favor 
of profiling, ethical considerations exist that argue against it. 
  Deontological arguments may be subjected to the criticism that they may lead to 
violations of the Pareto principle.  Sen (1970), for example, shows how the Pareto 
principle may conflict with individual liberties in a way that there exist configurations of 
laws that restrict liberties yet are unanimously preferred to any alternative in which these 
liberties are preserved.  Kaplow and Shavell (2001) make a similar argument that 
deontological considerations such as a concern for fairness may lead to conflicts with 
the Pareto principle.  
  My view is that there is no reason why the Pareto criterion should be regarded as 
having some special, i.e. lexicographic, ethical standing. This is not to say that welfarist 
considerations should not be a primary consideration in evaluating policies, only that 
deontological considerations may play a primary role as well.  Arguments in support of 
the primacy of the Pareto criterion imply a prior ethical judgment that there is no feature 
of social good outside the utilities of society’s members.  There is no reason why one 
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need reject the existence of these other features.  Hahn (1982, pg. 188) makes this 
argument as follows, in the context of the value of liberty: 
 
“A social state is not fully described by me if I am only given the utilities of the 
agents in that state.  I also need to know the liberty enjoyed by them.  It follows 
that my ranking of social states cannot be of the form of the social welfare 
function whose arguments are only the utilities of individuals.  If the utilitarian 
asks me why I should care about liberty over and above what is already 
recorded in the utility functions, I can answer that, for me, liberty is an intrinsic 
good just as for him utilities are intrinsic goods.” 
 
Suppose that an all-white society passed a set of laws that explicitly 
discriminated against blacks.  Would these laws be unjust and could someone outside 
the society argue against them?  I believe that the answer is clearly yes even though 1) 
no discriminatory consequences occur to any member of the society and 2) individuals 
may derive some utility from the existence of the laws.
11  Similarly, one could argue that 
one society is to be preferred relative to another due to the level of scientific and cultural 
attainments even if individuals in the other society are happier.  These examples suggest 
why one might in principle decouple ethical considerations from unanimity. As noted 
above, following arguments such as Sen (1979), one can make elaborate arguments that 
factors outside of individual welfare are morally relevant in evaluating societal 
outcomes, even if one places positive weight on individual welfare.
12  An appealing 
feature of Hahn’s formulation is that it recognizes that deontological considerations do 
not trump individual welfare considerations but that both are relevant in assessing 
policies.  This idea that different ethical criteria should be simultaneously entertained in 
evaluating policies is discussed in great depth in Roemer (2003) in the context of 
redistribution. 
                                                           
11This does not mean that the moral offensiveness of these is independent of the scope of 
their effect. By analogy, contemporary anti-Semitism in Japan is less offensive that anti-
Semitism in France at least partially because of its irrelevance; my argument is simply 
that the discriminatory laws are unethical and that this is a basis for rejecting the laws. 
12 Without going into detail here, many of the objections to welfarism amount to 
rejecting the idea that a policymaker should judge the appropriateness of individual 
preferences. Sen (1979) gives a number of interesting examples.  
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In the context of profiling, the considerations that impinge upon any welfare 
calculation are those that derive from our notions of justice.  Here, I will focus on a 
particular notion of fairness, one that may be linked to some of the conditional 
probabilities I have defined in Section 2.  To do this, I argue that an appropriate fairness 
criterion for profiling may be derived from the notion of equality of opportunity, 
specifically as understood by John Roemer in a series of studies, cf. Roemer 
(1993,1998).
13  Roemer makes the following argument. Suppose that society is 
considering an outcome such as education, and wants to determine whether the society 
provides equality of opportunity with respect to that outcome. Roemer argues that to do 
this, one must identify the determinants of the outcome and divide them into two 
categories: determinants for which an individual should be held responsible and 
determinants for which the individual should not be held responsible. A society should 
act in some way to indemnify individuals against harms that accrue due to those factors 
that they cannot control.
14
Roemer’s argument may be interpreted
15 probabilistically as implying that 
equality of opportunity requires that the conditional probability of an outcome should 
only depend on those factors for which an individual is responsible.  This general idea 
has straightforward application for the profiling problem since innocence and guilt are 
clearly characteristics for which an individual should be held responsible whereas race is 
clearly one that is not.  In the profiling context, I will not refer to equality of opportunity 
but to fairness.  For an innocent individual, complete fairness implies that the 
                                                           
13 Analyses such as Roemer’s represent the modern philosophical effort to provide 
foundations to egalitarianism.  Cohen (1989) is an excellent analysis of different 
approaches to egalitarianism, and well summarizes the egalitarian idea:  
 
“A person is exploited when unfair advantage is taken of him and he suffers from (bad) 
brute luck when his bad luck is not the result of a gamble or risk he could have avoided.  
I believe that the primary egalitarian impulse is to extinguish the influence on 
distribution of both exploitation and brute luck.  
 
Cohen’s notions of exploitation and brute luck are both involved in my discussion of 
fairness.  Decomposing their respective roles is perhaps a useful subsequent exercise. 
14Roemer recognizes that this distinction is not self-evident and needs to be adjudicated 
as part of a political process. 
15I defend this interpretation in Durlauf (1999,2002). 
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  ( ) ( ) Pr , Pr , SIW SIB =  (8) 
 
What implications does the fairness requirement (8) have for racial profiling 
strategies?  This equality may be rewritten   
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 represent the ratios of the conditional 
probabilities of innocence given race and search to the probabilities of innocence given 
race.  Therefore, it is possible for racial profiling to co-exist with fairness in the 
treatment of the innocent.  However, any differences in search rates that are race-based 
are consistent with fairness if and only if they reflect differences in efficiency of search 
decisions, i.e. that for the race where the stops occur more frequently, there is better 
screening of the innocent from others.  If there is no such information, then, each of 
these ratios equals 1 and fairness implies that regardless of the underlying innocence 
probabilities, the conditional probability of stops and searches should not differ across 
                                                           
16There is no guarantee that complete fairness can hold in a given context.  Measures of 
the extent of violation of eq. (8), for example  ( ) () Pr , Pr , SIW SI B − , can, in 
principle, be used to assess degrees of unfairness for alternative policies.   
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race, i.e. equal accuracy in assessing guilt implies that stops and searches should be 
random with respect to race, i.e. 
 
  ( ) ( ) Pr Pr SW SB = . (11) 
 
  If one accepts my definition of fairness, then it is straightforward to see why 
racial profiling may engender a basic tradeoff between fairness and efficiency.  As 
illustrated by a comparison of (8) with (3), the fairness criterion may be inconsistent 
with targeting stops and searches in order to minimize the crime rate; the criterion is also 
inconsistent with (5), the criterion that differentiates statistical from other types of 
discrimination. 
  Do existing racial profiling practices in fact involve a violation of fairness? It 
appears that there is a prima facie case to believe the answer is yes. Knowles, Persico, 
and Todd (2001) results, for example, imply that the stop rates for innocent blacks must 
exceed whites given the oversampling of blacks unless  ( ) ( ) Pr Pr I BI > W , a condition 
that is implausible given the general tendency of crime rates to be higher among blacks 
than whites; this condition is of course inconsistent with the standard rationale for 
profiling made by its advocates.  I am unaware of any evidence that (8) holds under 
profiling as has been practiced nor am I aware of anyone who has argued that the police 
are better able to identify black criminals than white ones when stopping automobiles, so 
that the profiling does not place a disproportionate burden on innocent blacks.  For 
Knowles, Persico and Todd,  ( ) Pr I B  would have to be over 2 times as large as 
( ) Pr I W  in order for the profiling pattern they studied to be consistent with (8), which I 
believe can be ruled out. 
  Thacher (2002) makes a very similar argument to the one presented here. 
Following Dworkin (2000), he argues that “morally homogeneous” (Thacher (2002) pg. 
8) groups should be stopped and searched at the same rate as violations of this would 
violate the principle that a government should “exhibit equal concern for each citizen’s 
liberty,” (Thacher 2002 pg. 10).   This leads him to argue that stop and search policies 
should obey (8) as well as  
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  () ( ) Pr , Pr , SGW SGB = , (12) 
 
which equates stop and search probabilities among the guilty as well.  
In my view, (12) is not necessary for fairness.   Guilt is an illegitimate choice in 
a way that, say cigarette smoking is not, and impinges on an individual’s claims on 
society.  An individual can achieve equal treatment if (8) holds so long as he chooses not 
to commit crimes.  This does not mean that violations of (12) cannot occur for unjust 
reasons; my claim is rather a violation of (12) is not by itself determinative of unfairness 
the way that (8) is determinative.  If (12) differs because there is some exogenous reason 
why it is easier to detect guilty members of one group versus another (for example, 
because the poorer group invests less in efforts to avoid detection), then violations of 
(12) do not seem offensive.  This is the corollary to the argument made above that fair 
stop and search policies need not equalize stop rates across races, as discussed in 
reference to eq. (10); differential rates are permitted because of differences in the 
accuracy of detecting criminals.  On the other hand, if (12) is violated because of a 
disproportional interest in identifying guilty blacks, then fairness is a consideration that 
needs to be addressed. So, if the police invest in technology that allows identification of 
black criminals when investment in a different technology that allows identification of 
white criminals has been rejected for reasons unrelated to minimizing the overall crime 
rate, e.g. prejudice, then one can construct objections to the violation.   
Put differently, the importance of fairness may be reasonably linked to individual 
responsibility. An individual’s claims to fair treatment by a government can be 
conditioned on certain requirements for individual behavior, in this case, law abiding 
behavior. To see why arguments that ignore this can go awry, consider the issue of 
selective prosecution of war criminals.  Browning (1992) studies a particular reserve 
army unit, Reserve Police Battalion 101, which was involved in civilian killings in 
World War II.  Because the members of the battalion were primarily from the same city 
(Hamburg), the records for the battalion were unusually complete, so the German 
government was able to prosecute members of the battalion.  Prosecutions of war 
criminals of this type were quite rare (Browning (1992, pg. 146)).   Does the fact that 
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one group of soldiers was singled out for prosecution because of a factor that was not 
under their control (the fact that they happened to end up in this particular unit) relevant 
to their prosecution?  Clearly not, since their actions determined their membership in the 
group, i.e. the decision to participate in war crimes. 
This issue of illegitimate choice and claims to fairness leads to a final issue that 
needs to be addressed.  To what extent should an individual be held responsible for his 
choices?  This question is less trivial than it appears, as may be seen in Roemer’s (1993) 
example of indemnification of individuals for the medical costs induced by smoking.  
Consider groups of smokers where the group is defined by characteristics that are not a 
choice variable, such as ethnicity.  Roemer argues that if a majority of individuals in a 
group smoke, then society has an obligation to share medical expenses with the smokers 
in a way that it would not for a group where smoking is an outlier behavior. Roemer’s 
idea is that the median behavior in a group reflects the factors to which group members 
have been exposed (e.g. role models, social norms, etc.) for which they cannot be held 
responsible.  
I claim that whatever the strength of Roemer’s approach, it does not naturally 
extrapolate to issues of the treatment of those who commit crimes.  In contrast, consider 
the question of war crimes guilt. One of Browning’s findings is that 80%-90% of the 
soldiers in Order Battalion 101 committed the war crimes when ordered to do so, and 
did so in the knowledge that they would not be punished for refusing.  Does the fact that 
a majority engaged in the action have the same salience in terms of the appropriate 
levels of condemnation and punishment?  Is the fact that a refusal to obey orders was an 
outlier behavior a mitigating factor?  It is fair to stipulate that the answer is clearly no.  
The difference between this case and Roemer’s is that the harms of cigarette smoking 
accrue to the smoker whereas the acts of members of the order battalion harmed others.  
So long as individuals are not automatons, society may reasonably expect them to 
overcome social pressure and influences to avoid clearly immoral acts.  This matters for 
my argument as I have differentiated the innocent and guilty in terms of their claims to 
equally fair treatment by society; the argument I have made means their choice is 
morally relevant and thus allows one to differentiate between them.  Of course, one 
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cannot equate drug possession with war crimes; my point is to show that there is no 
abstract reason why my differential treatment of the innocent and guilty is incoherent. 
The upshot of this discussion is that the levels of  ( ) Pr , SIW  and  ( ) Pr , SIB are 
the relevant objects in assessing the costs of profiling on individuals who have claims on 
full consideration by society; ceteris paribus, lower values for these probabilities are 
always preferred.  Fairness is violated whenever  ( ) ( ) Pr , Pr , 0 SIW SI B − ≠ , which 
will allow for partial orderings of different values of this difference.  And as argued 
above, as an empirical matter it is reasonable to conclude that current profiling practices 
violate fairness.   
 
   
5. The role of fairness in analyzing ambiguous environments 
 
One way to interpret a number of my arguments is that there is substantial model 
uncertainty present in the analysis of the effects of racial profiling.  The available data 
are consistent with models in which the disincentive effects of profiling are large as well 
as with models in which the disincentive effects are nonexistent.  Arguments about the 
costs of racial profiling at best rely on essentially anecdotal claims about the harms that 
are inflicted on African Americans by stops and searches.  From this perspective, there 
is an interesting parallel between the assessment of racial profiling and recent attempts 
in economics to deal with “ambiguous” economic environments, i.e. environments in 
which the true model of the economy is unknown and probabilities cannot be assigned to 
the possible models.  Much of this work has focused on the case where the true model 
lies in some space of possible models, but where one cannot assign probabilities to the 
elements of this space and thereby engages in standard Bayesian decisionmaking under 
uncertainty.  
One approach to resolving ambiguity is to adopt a rule for choosing a particular 
model to work within a model space. The best known approach of this type is the 
minimax approach where a policymaker assumes that the least favorable model among 
the elements of the model space is the “true” model and chooses a policy in response to 
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that; this strategy has been adopted in work on macroeconomic policy evaluation, cf. 
Hansen and Sargent (2003).  The minimax approach sets a lower bound on the losses a 
policymaker will incur.  It is often criticized as excessively risk averse; other criteria 
such as minimax regret (cf. Manski (2004)), which argues in favor of decisions that 
minimize the cost of not possessing complete information, have been advocated.  This 
amounts to another strategy for choosing a model in the model space and optimizing 
against it. 
The evaluation of racial profiling is very much an example where one must 
engage in decisionmaking in an ambiguous environment as we have no basis for 
assigning probabilities to different potential values of the behavioral response 
probabilities  () () Pr ,Pr GW SW and  ( ) ( ) Pr ,Pr GB SB , different levels of private and 
social costs to a stop and search, etc.  Can recent work on decisionmaking under 
ambiguity be used to evaluate racial profiling?  
For our purposes, it seems difficult to see how one could implement rules such as 
minimax or minimax regret to the profiling context.  One reason for this is that the 
model space under which racial profiling must be characterized is not well defined.  
How does one incorporate potential stigma or abuse into the model space?  How does 
one characterize the range of possible levels of emotional harm to profiling?  Similar 
problems exist because of the absence of a clear preference ordering over the 
consequences of profiling.  Even if the model space were clearly defined, in order to 
define the least favorable model or to define which actions minimize regret on the part 
of the decisionmaker one must specify how deterrence and fairness objectives should be 
traded off.  Preferences defined over the outcomes associated with racial profiling are 
not readily quantifiable in the way, say, the objective of minimizing the weighted sum of 
the variance of output and inflation is for a monetary policy authority. Further, 
differences in preferences with respect to efficiency and ethical goals will render the 
reporting of an evaluation exercise problematic unless the full range of possible 
preference orderings is considered. 
My analysis thus far suggests that there is an unambiguous ethical cost to 
profiling, violation of equal treatment of the innocent, which needs to be matched 
against the combined ambiguous deterrence effects and individual and social costs to 
  24 
stops.  Assume that within the range of potential deterrence effects that it is possible that 
the deterrence effect is large enough to trump all other factors and justify profiling. Does 
the absence of precise information on the model space and associated probabilities of 
models being true mean that one simply has to conclude that assessments of profiling 
cannot come to a conclusion?  I believe such a conclusion is overly pessimistic.  As an 
alternative strategy for evaluating racial profiling given the ambiguous model 
uncertainty inherent in the problem, I propose an alternative strategy, one that represents 
a response to the nature of the competing objectives that are at the heart of the 
evaluation: ethics and efficiency in meeting law enforcement objectives.   
In environments such as profiling, I propose that the ambiguity that attends the 
assessment of costs and benefits be adjudicated by a notion of presumption.  By 
presumption, I mean that certain actions by the government should be presumed to be 
inappropriate unless an affirmative case is made in their favor. In particular, I would 
propose as an evaluative criterion what I term a Fairness Presumption: 
 
A government policy that violates fairness in its treatment of individuals is 
presumed to be wrong and hence requires an affirmative defense.  The burden 
of proof is on the advocate of the policy to argue that the violation meets other 
social goals in a way to overcome the violation. 
 
  The Fairness Presumption employs a number of terms whose content needs to be 
defined before it is operationalized.  Most obviously, how does one characterize the 
burden of proof?  In fact, I do not think explicit definition is necessary for purposes of 
assessing the notion of presumption in the abstract.
17  What the definition requires is that 
an individual treat deviations from fairness as something that needs to be argued for.  
The purpose of the definition is not to resolve an issue, but rather to define a criterion by 
which one can structure a debate on the merits of a policy.  Similarly, work on virtues of 
deliberate democracy, initiated by Habermas (1984,1987) and nicely surveyed in the 
essays in Elster (1998) supports the notion that just decisions are those that derive from 
an appropriately structured process of interchange and debate.  The presence of a 
                                                           
17Further, legal systems employ different standards for the burden of proof according to 
context. The required evidentiary threshold is higher in criminal than civil cases, for 
example. 
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presumption for fairness structures policy debate in a way that treats individual equality 
as a primary good. Dworkin (2000) makes an elaborate argument on the primacy of 
equality in ethical analysis; in the narrow context of this paper Dworkin’s argument 
justifies the Fairness Presumption although Dworkin would go much farther.   
This approach to thinking about racial profiling implicitly moves us away from 
conventional decision-theoretic modeling to the more nebulous world of political debate.  
As such, it is consistent with some trends in political philosophy.  Scanlon (1998) for 
example, argues that one way to identify immoral actions is to identify those that cannot 
be reasonably justified.  This sort of argument attempts to derive moral conclusions on 
the basis of how rational agents with reasonable value systems will adjudicate issues. 
The Fairness Presumption makes explicit a “ground rule” for policy debate. The 
principle is a procedural one in that it means that for policy debates certain rules should 
exist to structure the resolution of disagreements.  This has some relation to Hampshire 
(2000) who argues that justice in procedures is something on which a consensus may be 
formed on the basis of asking how disagreements may be rationally adjudicated and 
justice in substance, where disagreements are inevitable. Unlike Hampshire, I reject the 
clean division between procedural and substantive justice in that the rules of 
adjudication I propose embody substantive values.  Unless the rules of adjudication 
embody some notion of what Nagel ((1979) p. 111) calls the “assumption of moral 
equality between persons,” it is not clear that rational adjudication has any content; the 
value of my opportunity to make arguments presupposes that those sitting in judgment 
will care about them.  As such, my approach addresses a criticism of Hampshire due to 
MacIntyre (2000).  
The principle I have proposed gives a “weak” priority to fairness in that other 
factors may overcome it. For example, one can imagine cases where an increase in 
unfairness is reasonably justified via appeal to Rawls’ difference principle, i.e. the 
decrease in fairness is justified if it improves the situation of the worst off person in 
society.  Similarly, a welfarist calculation can be used to justify an increase in expected 
average utility even though it violates fairness.  Whether an increase in unfairness can be 
justified using such arguments is context-specific.  The key to the principle is that the 
burden of proof is on the advocate of a policy if it decreases fairness. 
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Nothing said here solves the problem of model uncertainty as it pertains to racial 
profiling or any other policy questions.  Rather, I propose what I believe is a reasonable 
rule to help resolve the indeterminacy on decision evaluation that occurs in ambiguous 
environments. In some ways this strategy is similar to Bewley (2002) who argues in 
favor of an “inertia assumption” to resolve ambiguity; for Bewley, status quo behaviors 
are not altered unless there is a reason to do so.  The Fairness Presumption can be 
interpreted in parallel as saying that one does not move from a more to less fair set of 
policies unless there is a reason to do so.  It is not clear that one can do more than 
identify sensible principles when it is necessary to evaluate decisions in ambiguous 
cases.   
  Based on the Fairness Presumption, I conclude that the racial profiling in traffic 
stops and searches should be rejected as a law enforcement strategy.  Nothing in the 
available empirical literature suggests, in my judgment, that the deterrence effects are 
plausibly large enough to meet what I regard as an appropriate level of burden of proof 
to overcome the clear violation of fairness that occurs in that innocent blacks are stopped 
and searched more frequently than innocent whites.  I should reiterate that this argument 
is assuming that profiling violates (8), which in principle will not occur if due to 
differences in the ability of the police to identify the guilty by race, i.e. eq. (10); as 
argued before this case seems implausible. 
 
 
6. Relation to other policies 
 
  In this section I consider how the arguments of this paper relate to analyses of 
other policies that involve conditioning on race: anti-terrorism profiling and affirmative 
action. My intent is not to explore either of these difficult issues in detail but rather to 
indicate links between my analysis of profiling and how one might analyze these 
questions.   
 
i. anti-terrorist policies 
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  One reason why discussions of racial profiling are topical concerns the role of 
profiling in the war on terrorism.  Do my arguments against profiling in police stops and 
searches have force in anti-terrorism contexts?  I believe that any analogies that may be 
drawn are weak, so that one can oppose profiling in traffic stops and consistently 
support some forms of profiling in anti-terrorist conflicts. 
  First, the cases fundamentally differ in terms of potential benefits.  As I have 
emphasized above, assessment of racial profiling must be done in context in order to 
assess costs and benefits to individuals and in terms of tradeoffs between individual 
welfare and other social objectives. There is self-evidently a stronger case for profiling 
young Arab men stopped in vans in the vicinity of nuclear plants based upon potential 
harm relative to racial profiling in traffic stops and searches.   
A second important distinction between the two traffic stop and terrorism cases 
lies in the extent to which profiling will be efficacious in affecting crime.  One of my 
objections to racial profiling is the absence of any evidence that profiling in traffic stops 
is efficient in terms of combating crime. This latter argument was based on the claim 
that the only nontrivial effects of traffic stops on drug trafficking is via individual 
incentives, something for which we have no evidence.  In contrast, in the case of nuclear 
plants, the individuals subjected to profiling will include a nontrivial part of the potential 
criminal group, so the issue is stopping the particular individuals rather than inducing 
disincentive effects for a larger population of potential criminals.  The case that profiling 
will reduce the probability of a successful terrorist strike against a nuclear plant would 
seem to be much stronger. 
Further, it is difficult to see how the harm to individuals who are investigated in 
the nuclear power plant case is likely to be high.  The activity is easily avoided in a way 
that use of public highways is not.  In addition, this narrow context makes it relatively 
unlikely that the group of young Arab men would suffer general stigmatization if 
profiling is limited to very specific contexts such as this.  
Generally, defenses of profiling in traffic stops that employ analogies to 
terrorism fail because the costs and, especially, benefits are of different orders of 
magnitude. The fact that the press may be prohibited from publishing war plans has little 
bearing on other cases where the government attempts to exercise prior restraints on 
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freedom of the press.  Of course, none of this in any way justifies (or condemns) 
profiling of Arab Americans as is currently practiced by law enforcement. 
 
ii. affirmative action 
 
Affirmative action policies raise fairness issues that are closely related to those 
discussed in Section 4. After all, interpreted in its starkest form, affirmative action 
policies involve adding race as a conditioning variable for some outcome such as college 
admission or employment.  The affirmative action context in fact is useful in clarifying 
the difficulties that exist in operationalizing a concept such as the Fairness Presumption. 
To see this, consider the case of college admissions.  Letting  A denote admission, one 
might initially start with the notion that race should not have any bearing on admissions, 
so that 
 
  ( ) ( ) Pr Pr A BA = W . (13) 
 
Clearly, this definition of fairness is inadequate as it fails to account for past academic 
achievement; this corresponds to the idea that admissions are a reward for 
accomplishment and so captures intuitions that surround the idea of merit.  If we define 
past academic achievement as P, then one might wish to use a definition such as  
 
  () ( ) Pr , Pr , A BP A WP = . (14) 
 
However, once one thinks about past academic achievement, then additional problems 
arise.  Suppose that a black student has attended an inferior school, something for which 
he is obviously not responsible.  One might want to only condition on the component of 
past academic achievement that reflects effort E.  But if we modify the definition so that  
  
  () ( ) Pr , Pr , A BE A WE =  (15) 
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other problems arise. If stigma has affected a student’s past effort, then the variable for 
which we hold an individual responsible is partly determined by a factor outside his 
control.  The only point I wish to make here is that affirmative action is a morally 
complex problem, so much so that it is difficult to draw easy inferences as to what 
constitutes fairness   Roemer (1993,1998) specifically argues that this is to be expected: 
disagreements about the appropriate conditioning factors in assessing fairness are 
inevitable.  However, traffic stops do not seem to involve additional factors in the way 
that, say, college admissions and affirmative action do.  So, I see no strong reason to 
believe that opposition to profiling traffic stops imposes any constraints on one’s views 





My basic conclusion is simple: when assessed by welfarist and/or deontological 
arguments, the overall case in favor of racial profiling in traffic stops and searches is 
very weak.  The welfarist argument, that racial profiling reduces crime rates, has not 
been established empirically; studies of guilt rates and race do not identify the 
deterrence effects from the policies.  Retribution arguments, in the context of traffic 
stops appear to be second-order in comparison to deterrence. In addition, there are no 
good reasons to believe that the harms of profiling to African Americans are minor when 
considered either from the perspective of individual stops or the associated stigma that 
may be produced by a profiling policy.  From a deontological perspective, racial 
profiling violates an appealing notion of fairness: the equal treatment of the innocent.   
Moving from individual to social harms, I argue that profiling can be contributory to 
stigma against blacks.  This leads to a situation where, based on current information, one 
is trading an ill-defined (in a probability sense) degree of deterrence against a principle, 
namely fairness. I argue that a presumption should exist against implementing policies 
that violate fairness, so that the appropriate public policy conclusion is that profiling is 
unjustified. 
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One weakness of this discussion is the lack of attention to alternative policing 
strategies and crime patterns. To see how the first matters, part of Kennedy’s (1997) 
objection to profiling is that the police can find alternative strategies for choosing who to 
stop and search, strategies that do not require conditioning on race.  Kennedy does not 
provide specific discussion of alternative strategies and I am unaware of any author who 
does. Nevertheless, the case for profiling will be correspondingly weakened if Kennedy 
is correct.  A proper analysis of profiling requires a full specification of the strategy set 
available to police, which suggests a useful area for research.  Similarly, my discussion 
does not address the issue of opportunity cost with respect to police resources.   
As for crime patterns, one can imagine that complicated issues of fairness arise 
when there are correlations between the race of an offender and the race of a victim.
18 
My analysis has assumed that the aggregate crime rate is a sufficient statistic for 
understanding the rate of individual victimization, V.  Suppose that black and white 
criminals tend to affect members of their own racial groups. If a policymaker is 
interested in fairness in the allocation of police resources from the perspective of 
equalization of vicitimization probabilities, i.e., 
 
  () ( ) Pr , Pr , VIW VIB =  (16) 
 
then one could imagine a defense of profiling that derives from this.   To be clear, there 
is no reason to believe (and Randall Kennedy’s argument would militate against it) that 
profiling, as opposed to other policing strategies, is required for fairness with respect to 
victimization.  But it is important to recognize the possibility that different notions of 
fairness (in this case equality in stops and searches of the innocent versus equality in 
victimization of the innocent) may prove to conflict with better knowledge of the 
determinants of crime.  I conjecture that the analysis of the Fairness Presumption in 
cases such as this would require that a hierarchy of fairness claims be developed in 
which one considers first the direct effects of policy on fairness (in this case the 
profiling strategy on the innocent) and then the indirect effects (in this case, effects of 
the strategy on crime rates) that reflect the differential knowledge available in assessing 
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direct versus indirect effects.  In other words, I conjecture that there exists a hierarchical 
structure to presumption; the burden of proof is on the proponent to show that a policy 
promotes fairness indirectly when its direct effects reduce fairness.  Development of this 
argument is part of future work.  
To conclude, one interpretation of this essay is that what is needed is better 
evidence on the effects of profiling strategies on individual decisions, which means 
either the construction of new data sets and/or econometric methods that allow a 
researcher to identify (at least partially, in Manski’s (2003) sense) deterrence effects.  
Similarly, we have very little firm evidence on the effects of a stop and search on the 
well being of a motorist.  Many of the arguments I have presented concern the 
plausibility of empirical claims that have been made by others or appear to be necessary 
to justify profiling and typically my conclusion has been that these claims are little more 
than assertions.  For this reason, my conclusions should be read as contingent on our 
current ignorance.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
18I thank Petra Todd for stimulating this line of argument. 
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